





Emilie du Châtelet* 
 
The question of freedom is the most interesting question we could examine, 
since one can say that all of morality depends on this single question. 
Something so interesting justifies departing from my subject a little bit in 
order to enter this discussion, and to put here in front of the reader’s eyes 
the main objections that people make against freedom, so that he can judge 
for himself their soundness. 
I know that freedom has illustrious opponents. I know that people make 
arguments against it that can initially be seductive; [485] but these very 
arguments prompt me to report and refute them. 
We have obscured this matter so much that, when we want to talk about 
it and be understood, it is absolutely indispensable to start by defining what 
we understand by freedom.  
I call freedom the power of thinking of one thing or of not thinking of it, 
of moving or not moving, in accordance with the choice of one’s own mind. 
All the objections of those who deny freedom can be reduced to four main 
ones, which I will examine one by one.  
Their first objection aims to invalidate the testimony of our 
consciousness, and of the internal feeling that we have of our freedom. 
They claim that we believe we have this inward feeling of freedom merely 
due to a lack of attention to what is happening in ourselves; and that, when 
we pay reflective attention to the causes of our actions, we find, on the 
contrary, that they are always necessarily determined.  
Moreover, we cannot doubt that there are motions in our bodies that do 
not depend at all on our wills, such as the circulation of the blood, the 
beating of the heart, etc.; often also [486] anger, or some other violent 
passion, carries us beyond ourselves, and makes us perform actions of 
which our reason disapproves. According to them, these many visible 
chains that afflict us are proof that we are likewise bound in all other cases. 
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Man, they say, is sometimes carried away with such a speed and such 
jolts that he feels their upheaval and violence. Sometimes he is led by a 
calm motion that he is not aware of, but of which he is not any more the 
master. He is a slave who does not always feel the weight or the disgrace of 
his irons, but who is not for that reason any less a slave.  
This reasoning is very similar to the following: men are sometimes sick, 
so they are never healthy. But this opponent does not realize that, quite to 
the contrary, feeling one’s disease and one’s enslavement is proof that one 
was once healthy and free.  
When intoxicated, when under the influence of a violent passion, when 
one’s organs are disordered, etc. our will is no longer obeyed by our senses; 
and we are no more free to use our freedom in those cases, than we would 
be to move an arm in which we have a paralysis.  
Freedom, in man, is the health of the soul. Few people [487] possess this 
health completely and unfailingly. Our freedom is weak and limited, like all 
our other faculties: we strengthen it by becoming accustomed to 
performing reflections and mastering our passions; and this exercise of the 
soul makes it a little bit more vigorous. Yet, whatever efforts we may make, 
we will never manage to render this reason sovereign of all our desires; and 
there are always involuntary motions in our soul, just as in our body: since 
we are never wise, nor free, nor healthy, except to a very small degree. 
I know that one can, by all means, abuse one’s reason in order to 
question the freedom of animals, and to conceive them as machines, who 
possess neither feelings, nor desires, nor wills, though they have all the 
appearances of these. I know that one can forge systems, that is to say, 
errors, in order to explain their nature. But ultimately, when it is necessary 
to examine oneself, one must admit, if one is sincere, that we have a will; 
and we have the power to act, to move our bodies, to apply our minds to 
certain thoughts, to suspend our desires, etc.  
Thus, the enemies of freedom must admit that our inner feeling assures 
us that we are free; and I am not afraid to affirm that there is nobody who 
sincerely doubts his own freedom, and whose consciousness does not 
oppose the [488] artificial feeling by which they want to persuade 
themselves that they are necessitated in all of their actions. Therefore they 
do not contend themselves with denying this inward feeling of freedom; 
but they go even farther: were we to concede, they say, that you have the 
inner feeling that you are free, this still would not prove anything. After all, 
our feelings deceive us about our freedom, in the same way that our eyes 
deceive us about the size of the sun, when they make us judge that the disk 
of that star is about two feet wide, whereas in reality its diameter is to that 
of the earth as a hundred to one. 
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Here is, I believe, what we can respond to that objection. The two cases 
that you compare are very different. I can and must view the objects with 
respect to their size only as reason directs and based on the inverse square 
of the object’s distance. Such are the mathematical laws of optics, and such 
is the nature of our organs, that if my sight could perceive the real size of 
the sun, I would not be able to see any object on the earth; and that sight, 
far from being useful to me, would be harmful. It is the same with respect 
to the sense of hearing and of smell. I do not have, and cannot have, 
stronger or weaker auditory and olfactory sensations (all else being equal) 
except in proportion to the larger or smaller proximity of the bodies that 
are emitting the sounds or odors. Thus, God has not deceived me by 
making me see that which is distant from me in a size proportional to its 
distance. But [489] if I believed to be free, and I were not free at all, it 
would be necessary that God created me purposely to deceive me; since our 
actions seem free to us, precisely in the same way that they would seem to 
us if we really were free. 
Therefore, the only thing left to those who deny freedom is the mere 
possibility that we might be made in such a way that we are always 
invincibly deceived about our freedom. Yet, this possibility is based merely 
on an absurdity, since this perpetual illusion God would have created would 
entail a way of acting in the supreme Being that is unworthy of its infinite 
wisdom. 
Let no one say that it is unworthy of a philosopher to have recourse to 
this God here: for once [the existence of] this God has been proven, as it 
invincibly is, it is certain that he is the author of my freedom if I am free; 
and that he is the author of my error if, having made me an entirely passive 
being, he has given me the irresistible feeling of a freedom that he has 
denied me. 
This internal feeling that we possess of our freedom is so strong that 
making us doubt it would require no less than a demonstration proving to 
us that our freedom implies a contradiction. But surely there are no such 
demonstrations. [490] 
In addition to all of these reasons that destroy the objections of the 
fatalists, they are constantly forced to contradict their opinions themselves 
through their conduct: no matter how speciously one argues against our 
freedom, we always conduct ourselves as if we were free—so deeply is the 
internal feeling of our freedom engraved in our soul; and so much influence 
does it have on our actions, despite our prejudices. 
Driven into this corner, people who deny freedom continue by saying: 
The only thing of which this internal feeling, about which you make so 
much noise, assures us, is that the motions of our bodies and the thoughts 
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of our souls obey our wills. Yet, this very will is always necessarily 
determined by the things our understanding judges to be the best, just like a 
balance is always moved by the largest weight. This is how the links of our 
chain attach to one another. 
The ideas, both of sensation and of reflection, present themselves to us, 
whether you want them or do not want them, since you do not form your 
ideas yourselves. But when two ideas present themselves to your 
understanding—as for example the idea of going to bed and the idea of 
going for a walk—it is absolutely necessary that you will one of these two 
things, or that you do not will [491] either one. Thus, you are not free with 
respect to the act of willing itself. 
Moreover, it is certain that if you choose, you will surely decide in favor 
of your bed or in favor of the walk according to whether your 
understanding judges that the one or the other of these two things is useful 
and suitable for you. But your understanding can only judge to be good and 
suitable what appears to it in that way. There are always differences 
between things, and these differences necessarily determine your judgment; 
for it would be impossible for you to choose among two indiscernible 
things, if there were any. Therefore all of your actions are necessary, since 
by your own admission, you always act in conformity to your will; and as I 
just proved to you, (1) your will is necessarily determined by the judgment 
of your understanding, (2) this very judgment depends on the nature of 
your ideas, and finally (3) your ideas do not depend on you. 
Just as this argument, in which the enemies of freedom place their main 
strength, has several branches, there are also several responses. 
1. When they say that we are not free regarding the act of willing itself, 
that does nothing to our freedom, because freedom consists in acting 
or not acting, and not in willing and not willing. [492] 
2. Our understanding, they say, cannot help but judge that to be good 
which appears to it in that way; the understanding determines the will, 
etc. This reasoning is based solely on turning our will and our 
understanding, without noticing, into little entities, which they imagine 
act on each other and then determine our actions. But this is an error 
which only needs to be noticed in order to be rectified; for one easily 
feels that willing, judging, etc. are merely different functions of our 
understanding. Moreover, having perceptions and judging that a thing is 
true and reasonable—when one sees that it is actually so—is not an 
action but a simple passion: for it is in fact merely feeling what we feel 
and seeing what we see; and there is no connection between the 
approval and the action, between that which is passive and that which is 
active. 
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3. They say that differences among things determine our understanding. 
But they do not consider that freedom of indifference, before the 
pronouncement of the understanding, is a genuine contradiction with 
respect to things that are genuinely different; for, according to that 
beautiful definition of freedom, idiots, imbeciles, and even animals 
would be more free than us; and we would be all the more so when we 
have fewer ideas, and when we perceive fewer differences among 
things; that is to say, we would be more free to [493] the extent that we 
are more imbecilic, which is absurd. If that is the freedom that we lack, 
I do not think that we have much to complain about. Thus, freedom of 
indifference, with respect to discernable things, is not really a kind of 
freedom.  
With respect to the power of choosing between perfectly similar things, 
it is difficult to be able to say what would happen to us then, since we 
do not know that power. I do not even know if this power would be a 
perfection; but what is quite certain is that the self-moving power, the 
sole and true source of freedom, cannot be destroyed by the 
indiscernibility of two objects; for insofar as man has this self-moving 
power, man is free. 
4. With respect to the claim that our will is always determined by what our 
understanding judges to be best, I respond: the will, that is, the last 
perception or approval of the understanding—for that is the meaning 
of this word in the objection in question—this will, I say, cannot have 
any influence over the self-moving power, in which freedom consists. 
Thus, the will is never the cause of our actions, even though it is their 
occasion; for an abstract notion cannot have any physical influence over 
the physical self-moving power, which man possesses; and this power is 
exactly the same, before and after the last judgment of the 
understanding. 
It is true, it would be a verbal contradiction, morally speaking, [to say] that a 
being we presume wise did [494] something ridiculous. As a result, such a 
being certainly prefers that which its understanding judges to be the best. 
Yet, there would not be any physical contradiction in this, because one 
must carefully distinguish between physical necessity and moral necessity. 
The former is always absolute, but the latter is always contingent, and this 
moral necessity is entirely compatible with the most perfect natural and 
physical freedom. 
The physical power of acting is thus what makes man a free being, 
regardless of the use that he makes of it. The privation of that power alone 
would suffice to turn man into a purely passive being, despite his 
intelligence; for a stone that I throw would no less be a passive being if it 
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internally felt the movement that I have given to and impressed on it. 
Finally, being determined by what appears best to us is a perfection as large 
as the power of doing that which we have so judged. 
We have the faculty of suspending our desires and of examining that 
which seems best to us, so as to be able to choose it: this is one aspect of 
our freedom. The power to then act in accordance with this choice makes 
this freedom full and whole. When we misuse this power to suspend our 
desires and determine ourselves too quickly, that is when so many mistakes 
are made.  
The more our determinations are founded on good reasons, the more 
we approach perfection. And it is this perfection, [495] in the highest 
degree, which characterizes the freedom of beings that are more prefect 
than us, and that of God himself. 
After all, if we think about it carefully, God can only be free in this way. 
The moral necessity of always doing the best is even greater in God, 
because his infinitely perfect existence is above ours. Hence, the true and 
the only freedom is the power of doing that which one has chosen to do; 
and all the objections that have been raised against this type of freedom 
destroy equally that of God and that of man. As a result, if it were to follow 
that man is not free, because his will is always determined by the things that 
his understanding judges to be best, it would also follow that God is not 
free, and that everything in the universe would be effect without cause, 
which is absurd. 
The people, if there are any, who dare doubt the freedom of God, rely 
on these arguments: because God is infinitely wise, he is forced by a 
necessity of nature to always will the best; thus, all of his actions are 
necessary. There are three responses to this argument. (1) We should start 
by establishing what is best in relation to God, and antecedently to his will; 
this would perhaps not be easy.  
This argument thus comes down to saying that God is necessitated to do 
what seems best to him, that is, to do what he wills. Yet, I ask, is there 
another type of freedom? Is doing what [496] we want and what we judge 
to be most advantageous—what in the end pleases us—not exactly the 
same as being free? (2) The necessity of always doing the best is merely a 
moral necessity: but a moral necessity is not an absolute necessity. (3) 
Finally—even though it is impossible for God, as a moral impossibility, to 
go against his moral attributes—the necessity of always doing the best, 
which is a necessary consequence of it, destroys his freedom no more than 
the necessity of being omnipresent, eternal, vast, etc. 
Thus, due to his intelligence, man is under the necessity of willing that 
which his judgment presents to him as best. If it were otherwise, he would 
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have to be subject to a determination by something outside of himself, and 
he would no longer be free; for to will that which does not please is a 
genuine contradiction; and being free means doing what one judges to be 
best, what brings pleasure. We can hardly conceive of a being that has more 
freedom than the capacity of doing what pleases him. And as long as man 
possesses this freedom, he is as free as it is possible for freedom to make 
him, to borrow words from Mr. Locke. In the end, the Achilles of the 
enemies of freedom is this argument: God is omniscient; the present, future, 
and past are equally present to his eyes; but, if God knows everything that 
[497] I must do, it is absolutely necessary that I determine myself to act in 
the way that God has foreseen. Thus, our actions are not free. For if some 
future things were contingent or uncertain, if they depended on the 
freedom of man—in short, if they could happen or not happen—God 
would not be able to foresee them. Thus, he would not be omniscient.  
There are many responses to this argument which initially appears 
invincible. (1) God’s foreknowledge does not have any influence on the way 
in which things exist. This foreknowledge does not give things more 
certainty than they would have if God did not foreknow them. And if we 
do not find other reasons, the mere consideration of the certainty of divine 
foreknowledge is not able to destroy this freedom. After all, God’s 
foreknowledge is not the cause of the existence of things but is itself based 
on their existence. Everything that exists today cannot fail to exist while it 
exists; and it was as certainly true yesterday and from all eternity that the 
things that exist today had to exist, as it is now certain that these things 
exist. 
(2) The simple foreknowledge of an action, before it is performed, is no 
different from the knowledge of the action that one has after it is [498] 
performed. Thus, foreknowledge does not change the certainty of the event. 
After all, supposing for a moment that man is free and that his actions 
cannot be foreseen, will there not be, in spite of this, the same certainty of 
the event in the nature of things? And despite this freedom, was there not 
yesterday and from all eternity an equally great certainty that I would 
perform such an action today as there is presently as I perform this action? 
Thus, whatever difficulty there is in conceiving the way in which God’s 
foreknowledge is compatible with our freedom, since this foreknowledge 
merely contains a certainty of the event—which would always be present in 
things, even if they were not foreknown—it is obvious that this 
foreknowledge does not contain any necessity, and that it does not destroy 
the possibility of freedom. 
The foreknowledge of God is precisely the same as his knowledge. Thus, 
just as his knowledge does not in any way influence the things that currently 
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exist, so does his foreknowledge not have any influence on the things that 
are to come; and if freedom is otherwise possible, God’s power of making 
infallible judgments about free events cannot make them become necessary, 
since for that it would need to be the case that an action can be free and 
necessary at the same time. 
(3) In truth, it is not possible for us to conceive how God can foreknow 
future things, unless we suppose a [499] chain of necessary causes: for to 
say with the Scholastics that everything is present to God, not, to be sure, 
in its proper measure, but in another measure, non in mensura propria, sed in 
mensura aliena, would be to mix humor with the most important question 
that men can raise. It would be much better to confess that the problems 
that we have reconciling God’s foreknowledge with our freedom come 
from our ignorance of God’s attributes, and not from the absolute 
impossibility that exists between God’s foreknowledge and our freedom. 
After all, the compatibility of foreknowledge with our freedom is no more 
incomprehensible for us than God’s omnipresence, the infinite duration of 
God that has already passed, his infinite duration that is still to come, and 
so many things we will always be unable to deny and know. The infinite 
attributes of the supreme Being are chasms where our weak lights vanish. 
We do not know and we cannot know what relation there is between the 
foreknowledge of the Creator and the freedom of the creature; and, as the 
great Newton says, Ut cœcus ideam non habet colorum, sic nos ideam non habemus 
modorum quibus Deus sapientissimus sensit et [500] intelligit omnia; which means: 
“Just as the blind have no idea of colors, so we cannot understand how the 
infinitely wise Being sees and knows all things.” 
(4) I would furthermore ask those who, upon considering divine 
foreknowledge, deny the freedom of man, whether God was able to create 
free creatures? They have to answer that he was able to do this, since God 
can do anything, except for contradictions; and the attributes to which the 
idea of the necessary existence of absolute independence is attached are the 
only attributes whose communication [to creatures] implies a contradiction. 
But freedom is certainly not among these; for if it were, it would be 
impossible for us to believe that we are free, just as it is impossible for us to 
believe that we are infinite, all-powerful, etc. Thus one must either admit 
that God was able to create free things, or that he is not all-powerful, which 
I think nobody will say. Therefore, if God was able to create free beings, 
one can suppose that he has done so; and if creating free beings and 
foreseeing their determinations were a contradiction, why could God not, 
in creating free beings, ignore the use that they would make of the freedom 
which he has given them? This is not a way to limit divine power, only to 
[501] limit it to contradictions. For to create free creatures and to interfere 
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in any way possible with their determinations, that is a contradiction in 
terms; since that means creating creatures who are both free and not free at 
the same time. Thus it follows necessarily from the power God has of 
creating free beings that, if he has created such beings, his foreknowledge 
does not destroy their freedom, or that he does not foresee their actions. 
And someone who, on this supposition, denies the foreknowledge of God 
does no more deny God’s omniscience than someone who says that God 
cannot do what implies a contradiction denies God’s omnipotence.  
But we are not forced to make this supposition; for it is not necessary 
for me to understand the way in which divine foreknowledge and the 
freedom of man are compatible, in order to grant the existence of both of 
them. It is enough for me to be sure that I am free, and that God foresees 
everything that must happen. For in this way I have to conclude that his 
omniscience and his foreknowledge do not undermine my freedom, even 
though I cannot conceive how that happens—just as, once I have proved 
the existence of a God, I have to admit the creation ex nihilo, even though it 
is impossible for me to conceive it. 
(5) If this argument about the foreknowledge of God had any force 
against the freedom of man, it would likewise destroy that of God; for if 
God foresees everything that will happen, then it is not in his power not to 
do that which he has foreseen he would do. But it has been demonstrated 
above that God is free; freedom is hence possible. Thus, God was able to 
give his creatures a small portion of freedom, just as he has given them a 
small [502] portion of intelligence. Freedom in God is the power always to 
think whatever pleases him, and always to do whatever he wants. The 
freedom that God has given to man is the weak and limited power to 
perform certain motions and have certain thoughts. The freedom of 
children who never reflect consists only in willing and in performing certain 
motions. If we were always free, we would be like God. So let us be content 
with a share that is fitting to the position we hold in nature. But let us not 
renounce the faculties of a man just because we do not have the attributes 
of a God. 
